Carbon dioxide: making the right connection by Gibbs, Matthew Winton & Hofmeyr, Ross
Southern African Journal of Anaesthesia and Analgesia is co-published by Medpharm Publications, NISC (Pty) Ltd and Informa UK Limited  
[trading as the Taylor & Francis Group]
South Afr J Anaesth Analg
ISSN 2220-1181   EISSN 2220-1173
© 2017 The Author(s)
CASE REPORT
Southern African Journal of Anaesthesia and Analgesia 2017; 23(3):76–78
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/22201181.2017.1332292
Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons License [CC BY-NC 3.0]
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0
Carbon dioxide: making the right connection
Matthew Winton Gibbsa*   and Ross Hofmeyrab 
a Department of Anaesthesia & Perioperative Medicine, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa
b Inaugural Storz-UCT African Fellow in Airway & Thoracic Anaesthesia
*Corresponding author, email: gbbmat001@myuct.ac.za  
Carbon dioxide has been used in anaesthesia since the late 1920s, principally to stimulate breathing after a period of 
hyperventilation in the era before routine use of capnography. The authors’ tertiary academic hospital still has the infrastructure 
for pipeline delivery of carbon dioxide. A case is reported of accidental administration of carbon dioxide to a patient under 
anaesthesia, who was found to have end-tidal carbon dioxide (EtCO2) concentrations of greater than 25 kPa immediately after 
induction. This was confirmed on arterial blood-gas analysis. After successful resuscitation using an alternative oxygen source, it 
was discovered that the high concentrations were due to misconnection of gas pipelines during the refurbishment of a theatre. 
This highlights safety issues concerning pipeline provision of carbon dioxide, and that it is of utmost importance to confirm 
correct gas connections and supply before a new theatre is commissioned.
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Case report
A 58-year-old woman presented with cholangiocarcinoma with 
a background of Type 2 diabetes mellitus and human 
immunodeficiency virus infection. The emergency anaesthesia 
team was requested to provide general anaesthesia for 
percutaneous transhepatic cholangiogram and drainage of 
multiple intra-abdominal collections under radiological 
guidance. The procedure was to be performed in a recently 
refurbished and commissioned angiography suite. While 
previous general anaesthesia had been performed in the same 
theatre without incident, the required specific position of the 
patient led to the anaesthesia workstation being moved from its 
usual position, and an alternative set of wall gas outlets (unused 
since theatre refurbishment) being employed.
A rapid-sequence induction was planned due to clinical signs of 
sepsis and a history of gastro-oesophageal reflux. After 
preoxygenation with 100% O2, anaesthesia was induced with 
propofol, neuromuscular blockade with suxamethonium, and 
endotracheal intubation was performed. The patient was initially 
ventilated with a mixture of air (2 l.min−1) and oxygen (2 l.min−1). 
Bilateral chest rise and equal air entry on auscultation confirmed 
correct placement of the endotracheal tube (ETT). However, the 
capnograph showed no value or visible waveform, despite 
normal waveforms existing during preoxygenation. Vital signs at 
this stage were normal, except for an initial temperature of 38.2 
degrees Celsius. Oxygenation remained normal. Over the next 15 
min, however, the patient became progressively more 
hypotensive and bradycardic, requiring small doses of inotrope.
During this period, ETT placement was rechecked and senior 
help obtained. Occasional EtCO2 values were displayed, mostly in 
the region of 25 kPa. On close inspection, a consistently high, flat 
EtCO2 trace at the display maximum was visible. Assuming 
equipment malfunction, the heat and moisture exchange filter, 
capnograph sample line, gas analysis unit, water trap and soda 
lime were all changed. Due to suspicion of malignant 
hyperthermia (MH), volatile anaesthesia was discontinued, and a 
total intravenous anaesthesia (TIVA) technique commenced.
A new, clean anaesthesia workstation machine was obtained. 
During the changeover of machines, the patient was manually 
ventilated with a bag-valve-mask resuscitator and 100% oxygen. 
This resulted in return of a normal CO2 waveform. Resumption of 
ventilation with the new anaesthesia workstation resulted in a 
return to the original problem. An arterial blood gas sample 
demonstrated a pH of 6.69, pO2 of 20 kPa and a pCO2 of 25 kPa. 
Fearing residual contamination of the new machine with volatile 
agents, an ICU ventilator was obtained, which for expediency 
was connected to a different set of wall gas outlets. The problem 
again appeared to resolve. Subsequent blood gas analysis 
showed a significant improvement in arterial CO2 levels and pH. 
The procedure was continued uneventfully under propofol TIVA, 
and the patient was successfully extubated upon completion of 
the procedure.
A post-incident investigation was initiated, during which gas 
analysis was performed using the original wall gas outlet and 
both anaesthetic machines. When a mixture of air and oxygen 
was selected, persistently high values of CO2 (up to 27 kPa) were 
obtained. This resolved when oxygen and nitrous oxide were 
selected. Connecting the anaesthesia machine to the two other 
sets of wall gas outlets in the angiography suite showed no 
aberrant behaviour. As neither medical oxygen nor medical 
grade air should contain any carbon dioxide, it was then 
suspected that the third set of wall gas outlets was contaminated 
with CO2.
Access was obtained to the interfloor service level containing the 
gas pipelines supplying the angiography theatre. On inspection, 
it was found that during the installation process, a new set of 
outlets had been installed, providing a total of three sets for the 
theatre. To save costs and avoid drilling new holes, the existing 
carbon dioxide pipeline had been disconnected, and then 
reused for the new medical air outlets. Two of the three were 
correctly connected and repainted, but the third was accidentally 
reconnected to the carbon dioxide supply. Although repainted 
grey to designate its new planned role to carry medical air, 
specks of green paint revealed its original nature (see Table 1 for 
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pipeline colour standards). This was not apparent inside the 
theatre to the anaesthetic team. When pure oxygen was 
administered during preoxygenation, the patient was indeed 
receiving 100% oxygen. However, when an oxygen/air mixture 
was selected, the patient received a mixture of oxygen and 
carbon dioxide instead.
Discussion
Anaesthesiologists naturally assume that the wall outlets will 
deliver the correct medical gas, on the presumption that gas 
outlets have been tested on commissioning. In this instance, it is 
understandable that a thorough machine check did not highlight 
the problem encountered. During the machine check, it is 
customary to flow 100% oxygen to check O2 supply, and calibrate 
the capnography to room air. As the problem was with the 
medical air pipeline, neither action would detect the error. Only 
flowing air alone, and testing the oxygen concentration, would 
have elucidated the elevated CO2. This is not a commonly 
performed test. Careful attention to displayed pipeline pressures 
may, however, hint at a misconnection. In our hospital, CO2 is 
supplied at 1.8–2.0 bar, whereas the low-pressure air is supplied 
at 4.0–4.2 bar.
The capnography on the anaesthetic monitor did not display 
numerical values during most of the incident, as the value was 
well above the normal reference range. On close inspection 
during re-enactment of the scenario, it could be seen that the 
capnography trace displayed a flat line at the top of the screen, 
but this was very difficult to observe, as demonstrated in Figure 1. 
When the soda lime was replaced, a carbon dioxide trace was 
seen briefly, before disappearing again, as the soda lime became 
overwhelmed by the high flows of carbon dioxide. This case 
highlights the necessity of checking installed gas pipelines in 
any newly commissioned theatre, and checking each gas 
individually during a machine check.
A review of the literature shows that, whilst rare, the 
administration of the incorrect gas to a patient under an 
anaesthetic does happen on occasion. This is the first case we 
can find in the literature where carbon dioxide has been 
erroneously connected to a medical air pipeline. As oxygenation 
was never a concern – even in the face of impressive respiratory 
acidosis – the patient was initially very stable. Jerusalem and 
Starling showed in 1910 that hypercarbia resulting from an 
administration of a 20% CO2 mixture produced significant cardiac 
depression.1 Thus, the combination here of myocardial 
depression, vasodilation, sepsis and volatile agent, eventually 
led to bradycardia and hypotension.
Other cases reported include cylinders incorrectly filled with 
CO2.
2–4 In these cases, cardiac arrest or cardiac arrhythmias were 
prominent features. In another more recent case, a nitrous oxide 
pipeline was forced into a carbon dioxide outlet during an 
anaesthetic performed in Saint Louis, Missouri. This error was 
attributed to the similarity of the Diameter Index Safety System 
(DISS) between the two pipes, and the lack of experience of the 
technician involved.5 This cause of error was excluded in the 
particular interventional radiology theatre concerned, as the CO2 
DISS outlets had been replaced entirely.
Due to the use of relative hyperventilation in the era before 
routine capnography, CO2 was often used to stimulate breathing 
on completion of anaesthesia. CO2 delivery systems were 
included on Boyle’s anaesthesia machines from 1927. Despite 
concerns over safety, as late as 1988 a survey of carbon dioxide 
use by 1 100 British anaesthetists showed that 60.9% still used it 
daily, and a similar proportion considered having carbon dioxide 
cylinders on the machine as not being hazardous. Despite this, 
200 anaesthetists knew of an adverse incident involving CO2, of 
which 29% resulted in death.6
The heat generated by the chemical reaction between soda lime 
and carbon dioxide is spectacularly demonstrated when carbon 
dioxide is passed through fresh soda lime (see Supplemental 
video 1). This heat can be transmitted to the patient, as 
demonstrated in a case where the oxygen cylinder was filled 
with pure carbon dioxide and used during an emergency 
Caesarean section. The patient developed extensive respiratory 
burns distal to the tip of the endotracheal tube, and unfortunately 
subsequently died of respiratory complications four months 
post-incident.7 Our patient was probably protected because of 
the high proportion of oxygen mixed with the carbon dioxide, 
mitigating the heat production and avoiding harmful 
temperatures. Indeed, the increased fraction of inspired oxygen 
also prevented hypoxia despite the severe hypercarbia.
Despite the use of colour codes, clear labelling, diameter index 
and pin index safety systems, it is still possible to provide the 
wrong gas to the patient, if installation of lines is not checked 
and adequately supervised. As it is no longer routinely used for 
anaesthesia, discontinuation of pipeline CO2 supply has been 
proposed. However, it is still used for specific applications such as 
endoscopic surgery and fire suppression systems.
Table 1: Medical gas colour coding in use at Groote Schuur Hospital, 
based on South African National Standard (SANS) 7396-1
Gas Pipeline colour Cylinder colour
Oxygen White Black with white shoulder
Low-pressure air Grey Grey with black-and-white 
shoulder
High-pressure air Salmon pink
Carbon dioxide Green Green with grey shoulder
Medical vacuum Primrose yellow
Nitrous oxide Royal blue Royal blue
Entonox Royal blue and white 
bands
Scavenging Orange
Figure 1: Anaesthesia workstation being tested after the event; 
connected to faulty wall gas outlet and ventilating a test lung. While 
supplying only medical air, note the lack of oxygen or other gas on 
the analyser display, subtle high flat line EtCO2 trace and lack of 
capnograph reading.
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Recognition of sudden hypercarbia after induction should always 
stimulate the anaesthesiologist to consider hypermetabolic 
states such as malignant hyperthermia and thyroid storm. In this 
instance, the clinical findings did not match either condition, and 
a search for another source was appropriate. When doubt exists, 
it is prudent to switch to provision of 100% oxygen through a 
clean circuit or alternate delivery method. Our patient fortunately 
did not suffer any negative long-term sequelae, partly due to the 
quick action taken by the staff involved.
Important learning points:
•  Engineering short cuts do not save costs in the long run.
•  New theatres should be thoroughly checked, and all medical 
gas outlets analysed before commissioning.
•  Bizarre high readings of EtCO2 – in the absence of other fac-
tors suggestive of malignant hyperthermia or circuit valve 
malfunction – should make the anaesthesiologist consider 
exogenous carbon dioxide administration.
•  A manual bag-valve-mask resuscitation bag connected to 
separate source of oxygen is an essential lifesaving piece of 
equipment and helped identify the cause in this case.
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